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 Introduction
The first  half  of  2007 has abounded in important 
events  and  decisions  linked  to  Polish  European 
policy  and  bilateral  relations,  both  in  regard  to 
internal  EU affairs and external  issues, especially 
those connected with Russia. Decisions reached on 
these matters may carry long term consequences 
for  Poland’s  international  stature,  especially  in 
eastern  policy.  The  present  analysis  pertains  to 
activities of  the Polish  executive (the government 
and the president) over the six month period in the 
domain of European and eastern policy, proclaimed 
and perceptible motives behind these activities and 
their upshots, both immediate and longer term.
The EU summit in June was meant to decide on the 
success  or  failure  of  the  German  presidency’s 
attempt to resolve the treaty-related and functional 
impasse which Europe found itself in following the 
fiasco of an ambitious earlier effort to implement the 
so  called  Constitutional  Treaty.  And  although  its 
ratification was halted by the referendum fiascos in 
France and Holland, Poland was viewed as one of 
the principal naysayers. The reason was the initial 
public  declaration  deeming  the  European 
Constitution issue as settled, followed by a flurry of 
rash  counterproposals  to  the  German  offer  that 
virtually  all  member  states  had  supported.1 The 
essence of  the Polish  proposals  was not  entirely 
clear  and  comprehensible  for  European  partners 
and  public  opinion,  giving  the  general—though 
perhaps  wrong—impression  that  incumbent 
authorities  in  Warsaw are opposed to closer  and 
more effective European integration, and especially 
to the variant touted by Berlin, in principle and for 
ideological  reasons.  Such  interpretation  of  Polish 
1  As was the case inter alia with the Polish postulate to 
introduce the so called square root voting system. Tabled 
late and insufficiently marketed, without first winning support 
from any group of nations, it was then dropped at the very 
outset of the Brussels summit in favour of an entirely new 
proposal by the Polish government to extend the Nice 
system by a decade.
attitudes  was  reinforced  by  insufficiently 
transparent, disjointed and amateurish presentation 
of Poland’s stance. Although Britons, among others, 
raised serious and more fundamental reservations 
to  the  project,  the  opprobrium  for  braking  the 
integration  process  was  heaped  by  the  media 
squarely  on  Poland.  On  the  other  hand,  Polish 
government’s incoherent diplomacy and ineffective 
communications on Europe could well  have been 
due to its lacking a clear conception and strategy in 
regard to the Constitutional Treaty.
European  policy—between  ideology  and  internal 
politics
The  question  of  identification  and  of  the  form  of 
subsequent  public  and  diplomatic  presentation  of 
Polish  foreign  policy  objectives  and  proposals 
constitutes one of the principal problems enfeebling 
Poland’s  position.  A common criticism levelled  at 
this policy is its overemphasis on secondary issues, 
and sometimes outright  emotiveness and populist 
historicism.2 Such  accusation  are  not  the  sole 
preserve  of  Polish  commentators,  with  foreign 
media echoing them just as often in more or less 
objective or malicious manner, reflecting opinions of 
their own political and diplomatic elites. This in turn 
breeds  further  tension  on  the  Polish  side, 
paradoxically  accompanied by  the conviction that 
such external criticism but confirms the accuracy of 
the  diagnosis  upon  which  the  ruling  Law  and 
Justice Party’s (PiS) foreign policy is founded.
It is irrelevant to what extent such policy is rational 
or  irrational  from  the  standpoint  of  PiS  leaders, 
since in order to evaluate it we, and especially our 
foreign  partners,  need  first  and  foremost 
understand  it.  For  irrespective  of  how  ardently 
opponents contest the way in which the ruling party 
perceives  the  inner  workings  of  global  and 
European politics, this shall have little or no tangible 
2  Such claims were made, for instance, in the aftermath of the 
Polish veto in regard to opening talks with Russia on the 
new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
 effect  on  the  efficacy  of  Polish  foreign  policy, 
especially  in  its  European dimension.  In addition, 
any  charges  of  the  initial  diagnosis’s  irrationality 
have  hitherto  tended  to  raise  the  hackles  of  its 
followers, who tend to reject any further discussion 
of  the  matter.3 Moreover,  criticism  of  the 
government  frequently  met  with  responses 
involving  sundry  allegations  questioning  the 
sincerity,  intentions  and  even  patriotism  of  the 
critics, often labelled Party of the White Flag.
What  then  is,  broadly  speaking,  the  diagnosis 
espoused  by  politicians  who  have  ruled  Poland 
over  the  past  two  years?  It  rests  on  a  belief, 
frequently evinced in various official statements by 
the  president  and  the  prime  minister,  that 
antagonistic  national  interests  of  particular  states 
remain the decisive factor in international politics, 
and that this factor’s purport is augmented further 
still  within  the  European  Union.  Signally,  while 
among proponents of  closer European integration 
such  tendencies  cause  concern  and  spur  the 
adoption of certain countermeasures, authorities in 
Warsaw  view  each  perceived  symptom  of 
renationalization of European politics with singular 
glee.4 Such  renationalization,  weakening  of 
integrationist trends in favour of an increased role 
of  nation states within  the Union is,  according to 
this  group,  self-evident  and  only  the  naive,  or 
traitors even, waving the banner of the Party of the 
White Flag fail to grasp this.
The  second  component  of  the  these  politicians’ 
abovementioned  initial  diagnosis  is  the  belief  in 
Poland’s  unutilized  national  potential,  both 
economic  and,  more  importantly,  political,  or 
perhaps even military. This potential,  in abeyance 
3  Here, it is worth recalling the case of Paweł Zalewski, 
chairman of the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee and 
vice-chairman of PiS, who was almost expelled from the 
party for publically inquiring about the course of the Brussels 
negotiations and actions of minister A. Fotyga’s FO, during a 
Committee meeting.
4  Such an opinion was, for instance, presented by one of the 
deputy foreign ministers during a CIR seminar on the 
potential renationalization of German foreign policy.
under  communist  yoke,  must  be  developed  for 
Poland to catch up with European countries which 
grabbed  their  opportunity  in  the  post-war  years. 
Only a strengthened nation state, with a sense of 
patriotism, pride and national interest inculcated in 
its  elite  and  society,  strong  national  industries, 
banking sector and other strategic branches of the 
economy (as well as powerful army and intelligence 
services)  can  participate  in  and  help  shape  the 
process  of  European  integration  on  an  equal 
footing,  commensurate  with  its  aspirations  and 
demographic  and  geographic  potential.  Leading 
politicians  and  advisers  in  the  government  and 
presidential  administration  have  oft  reiterated  the 
opinion that Poland is still too weak to be cast into 
Europe’s  political  free  market  without  any  sort  of 
temporary protection period needed to reform and 
consolidate the structures of a new state—the so 
called  4th Republic.  Thus,  according to  this  logic, 
European  integration  ought  to  be  slowed  rather 
than speeded up, at least until the edifice of the 4th 
Republic  is  complete,  unless  prohibitive  Polish 
postulates,  like  those  pertaining  to  the  voting 
system,  are  approved.  Guaranteed  the  option  to 
block  any  proposals  that  go  against  what  it 
considers  its  raison  d’état,  Poland  might  even 
consider  ratifying  a  new,  trimmed  EU  Reforming 
Treaty,  since  it  would  not  advance  the  cause  of 
European integration against the will of Polish ruling 
elite.
This  is  why  the  strategy’s  many  European  and 
Polish critics have claimed ideology as the principal 
reason behind Polish government’s blurred, passive 
yet  verbally  belligerent  stance,  which  paid  scant 
heed to external opinion. In particular, they pointed 
to  the  negatively  charged  belief  that  common 
European  policy—be  it  in  the  domain  of  foreign 
affairs, security or energy—not only fails to live up 
to  expectations  and  to  secure  Polish  national 
interests,  but  in some respects  actually threatens 
 them.5 This threat is seen to stem mainly from the 
danger,  frequently  underscored  in  internal 
propaganda,  of  German  dominance  of  the  EU, 
formally  enshrined  in  the  new  double  majority 
voting system.
The “policy of selective integrationism”6,  which its 
proponents regard as the basis for a Poland new 
European policy, calls for unequivocal delineation of 
areas  that  are  to  remain  outside  the  EU’s  remit. 
“For  now”  one  such  area,  they  claim,  is  foreign 
policy, as today and in the foreseeable future any 
integration  would  entail  huge  risk  of  having  to 
formulate a common foreign policy under the diktat 
of  the  EU’s  biggest  states,  or  of  Germany  itself. 
This  conception  has  been  advanced  by  the 
opposition  to  instituting  the  post  of  EU  foreign 
minister.7 How and why common European foreign 
policy actually threatens Polish interests has not as 
yet been elucidated, barring the slogan of “big state 
diktat.”
It is also worthy of note that the above views are 
burdened with a fundamental logical inconsistency. 
For  if  Poland  is  sufficiently  strong  to  conduct  an 
effective  independent  and  fully  sovereign  foreign 
and security policy, especially in regard to the East, 
which would justify the redundancy of EU support in 
this domain, then it would also deserve the label of 
one of “EU biggest states,” not just due to its size 
5  Further evidence adduced in favour of this thesis includes 
cordial bilateral relations between European leaders 
(German, in particular) and Russia’s president, which 
supposedly lead to docile policy towards Moscow, displayed 
in an unwillingness to back Ukraine’s European aspirations 
and in support for the Northern European Gas Pipeline.
6  Marcin Libicki, "Unia zmiennych sojuszy" [Union of 
alternating alliances], GW no. 29/2006 after: 
http://www.europartner.com.pl/czytaj.php?jaki=398&archiw
7  By way of reminder, the post of EU foreign minister, 
propounded in the draft European Constitution, was to 
harmonize and tidy the complicated structure of representing 
EU interests abroad. This was to be achieved by combining 
the hitherto separate posts of External Relations 
Commissioner (currently held by Benita Ferrero-Waldner) 
and of Secretary-General of the Council of the European 
Union/High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, located within intergovernmental structures 
(currently held by Javier Solana). Such a minister would 
head the European External Action Service, a fledgling EU-
wide diplomatic corps.
and  population,  but  also  because  of  its  political 
potential.  Thus,  a  member  of  the  eurosceptics’ 
purported  “diktat”  posse,  Poland  would  have  no 
reason to fear the unionization of foreign policy. If, 
however,  authors  of  the  Polish  conception  of 
selective  integration  do  not  regard  Poland  as 
belonging to the group of Europe’s major powers, 
they are by the same token questioning its ability to 
conduct effective foreign policy in the contemporary 
world.
This diagnosis, based upon a very traditional notion 
of patriotism, leads to the belief that integration with 
European  structures  had  been  premature  and 
based  on  conditions  that  were  not  entirely 
beneficial.  It  also  engenders  the  conviction  in 
untimely  and  detrimental  character  of  the 
privatization of purportedly valuable national assets, 
including  the  media  and  banks,  which  fell  into 
foreign hands as a result of premature opening of 
the domestic market. Finally, it entails the emphasis 
on  traditionally  construed  aspects  of  national 
security  founded  on  strong  autonomous  defence 
potential.8
However, this is by no means not to say that such 
an  interpretation  of  Poland’s  situation  and 
development  prospects  calls  into  question  Polish 
presence in the EU. Just that this is construed in 
purely instrumental terms, as a source of cash to 
narrow  the  civilizational  gap,  and  not  as  an 
attractive political project in its own right.9
Polish politicians’ take on  Polish  national  interest 
would  in  effect  be  of  scant  significance  in  the 
8  “Of course, taking a bird’s eye view of the world one could 
well ask: why the need for armed forces? But since time 
immemorial, they have always turned out indispensible, and 
though perhaps one day some new world will obviate this 
need, we are not there yet. Poland must have an army 
commensurate with its role as the European Union’s sixth 
power, and one of NATO’s larger members,” president Lech 
Kaczyński at a press conference following the briefing of 
chief representatives of the Ministry of National Defence and 
the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland: 
http://www.bbn.gov.pl/?lin=2&gal=1&idtext=896
9  Prime minister Jarosław Kaczyński’s policy address to the 
Lower House of Parliament, 19.07.2006: 
http://www.kprm.gov.pl/1433_18017.htm
 European dimension, were it not for their projection 
of this ideology and phraseology onto the alleged 
motives  of  other  states.  Putting  it  briefly,  this 
amounts to saying that other European politicians in 
essence think and act like them, that the traditional 
and  narrow  construal  of  national  interest 
demarcates  the  political  horizons  of  other  EU 
leaders.
For example, such projection of attitudes appears 
to  move  the  present  Polish  authorities  to  place 
excessive  emphasis  on  the  role  ascribed  to  the 
German government in various actions of German 
business,  comments  in  German  media,  or  even 
activity of independent organizations or individuals, 
which are viewed as either detrimental or at least 
uncongenial to Polish interests. Paradoxically, this 
picture of the world provides a better starting point 
for talks with Russian politicians, who seem inclined 
to  view  the  mechanisms  governing  the 
contemporary world in similar light, bearing in mind 
that their interests are at odds with those of Poland 
and  that  they  interpret  opinions  prevalent  in  the 
Polish  media  as  reflecting  the  intentions  of  the 
government in Warsaw. Authorities of the People’s 
Republic of Poland, like those of other totalitarian 
states, never accepted the truth that critical press 
articles, BBC radio broadcasts, verbal interventions 
by  the  International  PEN  Club  or  Amnesty 
International  are  actually  entirely  independent  of 
government.  The  current  authorities,  driven  by  a 
priori preconceptions, are inadvertently slipping into 
the same old rut.
The specific polonocentric approach to international 
matters  is  not  purely  negative  (accusing  others, 
usually  Germans,  of  some  ulterior  ideological 
motives purportedly informing wholly pragmatic or 
incidental actions or lying behind the co-occurrence 
of  unrelated  events  or  circumstances),  but 
paradoxically takes centre stage in situations where 
Polish  authorities  wish  to  make  a  positive 
contribution  to  European  or  international  debate. 
This was the case with the famed Musketeer Pact 
on energy, otherwise known as NATO Energy Pact, 
a  paramilitary  proposition  running  parallel  to  the 
European discussions of the time and to promarket 
proposals to liberalize the energy market and forge 
a  common  energy  policy.  It  is  also  the  case 
presently, with media reporting that Polish leaders 
view the creation of a European army as European 
integration’s most pressing issue, in place of, say, 
resolving the problem of the Constitutional Treaty. 
Similarly, obdurate promotion of EU enlargement to 
the  East  runs  counter  to  ever  more  assertive 
warnings by remaining EU members that this shall 
be impossible without first settling internal issues, in 
particular that of the aforementioned Constitution.10
However, it is not just Poland’s governing elite who 
have  trouble  grasping  its  European  partners’ 
foreign policy intentions and objectives. At present, 
in Poland the very notion of national interest has an 
ideological-historic  hue distinct  from the practical-
economic  approach  prevalent  in  Germany  or 
France.  The  strong  emphasis  on  the  role  of  an 
historic  national  community,  the  Church,  causal 
power  of  the  state  and  centralized  government, 
anti-liberal  remonstrations,  close  ties  with  Radio 
Maryja,  and  even  actions  aimed  at  sexual  or 
cultural minorities, are all frequently interpreted as 
evidence  for  a  decent  towards  authoritarianism. 
Misinterpretation  of  Polish  government’s  motives 
and  objectives  thus  favours  simplifications  which 
are  meant  to  help  comprehend  the  Polish 
phenomenon by invoking extreme political currents 
of yore.11
10  Such opinions have been voiced by the European 
Commission president, German chancellor and Belgian 
prime minister, among others.
11  Similar fears have more often been expressed by the media 
than by official government structures or politicians. Articles 
portraying Poland to that effect have appeared specifically in 
the Financial Times, as well as in German and French press. 
One typical remark regarding Poland was uttered in August 
by Günter Nooke, CDU member and German government 
commissioner for human rights, when he warned of 
impending gleischaltung—a term signifying forced of opinion 
 These phenomena’s negative tenor is exacerbated 
by a breakdown in communication between the new 
ruling elite, ensconced in its ideological milieu, and 
opinion-forming, intellectual, professional, academic 
and,  for  the  most  part,  media  circles,  concerned 
about  such  proclivities.12 This  reflects  not  only  a 
political  divide,  but  also  what  could  be  termed 
worldview, intellectual or cultural one.
Lacking any real communication, other factors take 
centre  stage,  to  wit  intentions,  suppositions, 
rumours,  and  sometimes  even  prejudices  and 
personal  or  group  animosities.  Strident,  often 
exceedingly  superficial,  “vulgarized”  ideologization 
of foreign policy, viewed as yet another element of 
PR, inevitably provoked a reaction on the part of its 
opponents,  often  from  outside  official  political 
opposition. Arguments are replaced by a veritable 
profession  of  faith  in  the  party  leader  or 
programme, by underscoring one’s own patriotism 
or gainsaying that of one’s antagonist, or by more 
or  less  overt  insults.  Both  sides  of  the  political 
conflict have ceased to talk to one another. Worse 
still,  the  middle  ground  of  apolitical  punditry  has 
been  eradicated:  deliberately  or  inadvertently, 
virtually everyone must declare their allegiance, or 
risk having it done for them.13
and referring to the situation in the Third Reich (GW, 
21.08.2006).
12  Experience of CIR or similar bodies suggests that, with a 
few exceptions, politicians of the ruling coalition shun 
seminars and conferences organized by institutions from 
outside their ideological sphere, despite reiterated 
invitations.
13 Such was the reaction of the president and prime minister, 
both  linked  to  PiS,  to  the  letter  signed  by  8  former  foreign 
ministers, including postcommunists, post-solidarity figures and 
apolitical  technocrats  (Władysław  Bartoszewski,  Włodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz,  Bronisław  Geremek,  Stefan  Meller,  Andrzej 
Olechowski,  Dariusz  Rosati,  Adam  Daniel  Rotfeld  i  Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski). They were most vociferously attacked by Antoni 
Macierewicz,  the  deputy  defence minister,  who  labelled  them 
former soviet agents: “...some of these people are ex-members 
of Polish United Workers’ Party, a soviet proxy if ever there was 
one. And most of them had in the past been agents of the soviet 
intelligence services. (...) In connection with this action of their, 
we  need  to  consider  some  external  action.  This  cannot  be 
precluded,  especially  if  we  take  into  account  the  degree  of 
damage  to  the  state  that  their  act  has  done.  Here,  we  are 
dealing with a group act that is presented as that of individuals 
from different ends of the political spectrum, while in reality they 
all represent the interests of postsoviet structures. Almost all, for 
there is the dramatic problem of Mr Bartoszewski’s participation, 
Thus, up until  the Samara and Brussels summits 
Polish authorities seemed to ground their European 
policy in euroscepticism and/or misunderstanding of 
the essence of European integration, a conviction 
that any acceleration or specification thereof always 
threatens  anachronistically  construed  Polish 
national interests—viewed both as interests of the 
state,  and  (as  junior  coalition  partner  League  of 
Polish Families would have it) as the very existence 
of a nation imperilled in its moral rectitude by the 
liberal  scourge  engulfing  the  West.  European 
legislation and scheduled regulatory changes have 
increasingly  been standing  in  the  way of  various 
government projects aimed at hastening the moral 
revolution,  the  fight  against  the  establishment, 
decommunization,  lustration,  etc.,  perceived  as 
restrictive or confrontational in relation to the rights 
of  the  nation  state  and  policy  in  regard  to  its 
citizens.  Clearly,  this  approach  to  the  issue  of 
European integration had, and still has a significant 
internal  aspect  closely  tied  to  the  ruling  party’s 
political  calculations  and  its  espousal  of  a  highly 
specific electorate. Whence, perhaps, the spurious 
impression that  in  truth  the ruling  party  does not 
implement a foreign policy in any strict sense, but 
treats it solely as an element of internal politicking, 
or even a means of mounting a permanent election 
campaign.  Similar  phenomena  certainly  occur 
elsewhere, but in view of the fact that at least over 
the past four years every subsequent government 
has  suffered  form  a  lingering  sense  of 
impermanence,  and  practically  every  month  sees 
political tensions and crises that could well result in 
an  early  general  election,  this  is  particularly 
egregious  and  damaging  to  the  country’s 
international standing.
One specific class of behaviour is utter disregard of 
the  consequences,  not  so  much  for  worldwide 
opinion  of  Poland,  as  for  the  very  possibility  of 
which I’m still at pains to grasp,” GW, 21.08.2006.
 conducting  an  effective  foreign  policy  on  the 
European and transatlantic level, of inclusion in the 
Polish  government  of  extreme  nationalist  and 
quasi-catholic fundamentalists,  widely depicted by 
Polish and foreign media as sympathizing with, or 
even heirs to xenophobic or Nazi traditions. 
Between Russia and Germany...
The stigma of internal politics extends to relations 
with  Russia  and  Germany.  One  could  get  the 
impression  that  besides  the  declared  tactical 
objectives Poland’s protracted silence with regard 
to German proposals to rekindle the constitutional 
debate  had  a  largely  internal,  Polish  political 
context, linked to rivalry over “rightwing hearts and 
minds”  and  support  for  father  Tadeusz  Rydzyk’s 
media empire, of particular value given the ongoing 
risk of early general elections. Evidently, in official 
or  diplomatic  exchanges  or  interviews  with  the 
foreign  press,  politicians  of  the  ruling  party  can 
distance  themselves  from  such  nefarious 
tendencies,  ensure that  it  is  purely  a  question of 
tactics, that in truth neither the prime minister, nor 
the  president  or  the  foreign  minister  do  not  hold 
anti-European or anti-German prejudices. Yet, each 
following  week  brought  another  batch  of 
generalized  and  oversimplified  statements  about 
negative  trends  in  German  public  life,  or  the 
country’s  economic  policy,  generally  calling  into 
question the point of any previous policy of Polish-
German cooperation, as well as the patriotism of its 
Polish exponents.
On the contrary,  relations with Russia provide an 
illustration of possible common European policies. 
Previously,  EU’s larger  member states did in  fact 
seem  excessively  lenient  and  not  so  much 
acquiescent,  as  dismissive  of  the  upshots  of  a 
peculiar  Russian  policy  consisting  in  different 
treatment of old and new EU members. They also 
heeded  Moscow’s  suggestions  that  new  EU 
members  are  driven  by  some  postcolonial 
complexes, etc. Until the Samara summit, the policy 
of Schröder or Chirac amply exemplified the threats 
posed by a foreign policy whereby Poland would, 
say,  possess  no  means  to  block  actions  that 
disregarded  or  even  impinged  upon  its  interests. 
However, taking into account nation states’ rights, 
this would be no  common policy. Moreover, had 
EU leaders in Samara reneged on the principle of 
member  solidarity  would  any  chance  for  a 
compromise  on  the  EU  Reforming  Treaty  would 
surely  have  been  scuppered,  providing  Warsaw 
with  a  deeply  justified  argument  in  favour  of 
continuing  its  opposition  to  such  a  compromise. 
President Putin also did his fair share to remedy the 
situation, since his policy has been causing growing 
concerns in Europe and the world.  After Samara, 
this  pretext  became  obsolete,  and  thus  both 
European  and  Polish  opinion  expected  the 
government  in  Warsaw  to  display  greater 
willingness  to  compromise on the treaty.  What  is 
more,  if  Polish  ruling  elite’s  real  motive  for  its 
tactical, and not strategic, euroscepticism was not 
ideology but broader apprehension over the EU’s 
undue  submissiveness  towards  Russia  and  a 
disbelief  in  European solidarity,  then  the  Samara 
summit should have done plenty to dispel any such 
fears.
It  also  seems  that  paradoxically—albeit  with 
disparate motivations—both Warsaw and Moscow 
failed to perceive the shift in European political and 
business elites’ attitude towards Russia, an end to 
the era of  Schröder, Berlusconi and Chirac. Being 
on  Gazprom’s  payroll  and  overtly  defending 
Russian economic and political interests, the former 
German chancellor has done more than anyone to 
discredit  the  notion  of  a  strategic  partnership 
between  Russia  and  Germany,  making  it  into  a 
simple lobbying issue. The scandal over the murder 
 of  Alexander  Litvinenko,  a  former  FSB operative 
and,  importantly,  British  citizen,  or  the  death  of 
Anna  Politkovskaya,  a  Russian  journalist  and 
darling  of  the  Western  media,  won  Russia  little 
favour.  As  did  subsequent  addresses  by  the 
Russian president during international  summits or 
in  Russia  itself,  unequivocally  perceived  as 
aggressive  and  confrontational.  Attempts  by 
Russian oligarchs to take up shares in, or even take 
over strategically significant western companies not 
just in the energy sector (e.g. the discrete purchase 
via  European  bourses  of  a  big  stake  in  the 
European defence giant EADS), have lent credence 
to Polish, and others’, warnings against inordinate 
dependence  on  the  Russian  partner  and 
endorsement  of  its  undemocratic  practices. 
Systematic  cuts  in  energy supplies to  recalcitrant 
neighbours,  mysterious  pipeline  breakdowns, 
refinery fires, cyber-attacks on Estonian institutions 
and  anti-Estotnian  hooligan  riots  in  Tallinn  and 
Moscow, inspired by the upper echelons of Russia’s 
ruling establishment, or finally a series of evasive 
actions  against  EU  mediation  and  absurd 
accusations  over  Polish  meat,  have  sufficed  to 
convince EU leaders to send a clear warning to the 
Russian  authorities.  All  the  more  so  given  the 
concomitant  furore  over  the  future  of  European 
integration and a lingering threat of Polish veto over 
the European constitution.
EU compromise—success or failure?
At  present,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Brussels  and 
Samara summits it transpired that the EU is not just 
capable of reaching internal consensus, but also of 
concerted  action  towards  the  outside  world.  It  is 
prepared  to  rise  above  particular  interests  of  its 
largest  members,  arriving  at  a  workable 
compromise  in  Brussels  or  standing  shoulder  to 
shoulder  against  Russia  in  defence  of  Poland, 
Estonia or Lithuania, even though not all  member 
states  share  these  countries’  motives  or  attitude 
toward Moscow. The Samara summit in particular 
ended  in  a  way  that  took  Polish  authorities  by 
surprise,  perhaps even somewhat  modifying their 
stance, or rather strategy,  as evinced by Poland’s 
greater propensity to compromise a month later in 
Brussels.
With  a  Brussels  triumph  under  its  belt,  Poland’s 
government  would—were  it  not  for  the 
aforementioned primacy of internal politics and pre-
election  propaganda—have  had  a  unique 
opportunity to celebrate more than just successful 
enlivening European solidarity and the EU’s eastern 
policy.  Politically,  at  the  European  level,  it  found 
itself  stuck.  With  Warsaw  authorities  having 
trumpeted  the  success  of  negotiations,  and  with 
Polish postulates (including those pertaining to the 
Nice  voting  system)  largely  satisfied,  virtually 
everyone in Europe expected the country to return 
the  favour  at  the  level  of  practical,  everyday 
European  policy,  and  Poland’s  government  and 
president  to show less intransigence and a more 
proactive  approach.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Brussels compromise, possibly too hastily hailed as 
a  unilateral  Polish  victory,  provoked  an  almost 
unanimous  uproar  among  the  opposition—be  it 
parliamentary,  e.g.  Civic  Platform  (PO),  or 
intragovernmental,  i.e.  League  of  Polish  Families 
(LPR)  and  Self  Defence.  PO  accused  the 
government  of  too  easily  dropping  the  so-called 
square root voting system, while LPR censured it 
for practically betraying Polish interest by agreeing 
to  the  new  Reforming  Treaty.  In  the  midst  of  a 
government  crisis  this  engendered  a  decisive 
reaction on the  part  of  prime minister  Kaczyński, 
who dismissed LPR’s deputy foreign minister, with 
immediate  effect,  for  having  criticized  the  foreign 
minister Anna Fotyga.14
14  IAR, PAP, 28.07.2007
 Were it  not  for  the  internal  political  factor,  which 
hinders  any  braver  turns  in  European policy,  the 
government  and  president  could,  given  the  will, 
prove  that  accusations  of  anti-European  motives 
and prejudices levelled at them are spurious. That 
these  are,  if  anything,  a  thing  of  the  past,  with 
Polish  authorities  now  currently  inclined  to 
participate  more  actively  in  propping  up  the 
European project, in the strategic interest of Poland 
itself,  and  of  Europe  as  a  whole.  Polish 
government’s retreat  from earlier  ideas to  reopen 
negotiations concluded in Brussels on the so called 
Ioannina  mechanism  and  its  acceptance  of  the 
Portuguese  presidency’s  continued  work  on  the 
Treaty, give room for hope.
This is all  the more significant, as there is now a 
good  chance  that  the  EU’s  eastern  policy,  long 
postulated by Poland, will take greater account of 
our  perspective.  However,  counting  on  others  to 
pay full heed to our priorities constituted yet another 
illusion  and  error,  which  could  well  prompt  a 
paradoxical  outcome:  creation  of  an  EU  eastern 
policy spearheaded by a different, apparently less 
troublesome and testy country, e.g. Romania, with 
the  so  called  European  Neighbourhood  Policy 
Black Sea Synergy, which is to cover all postsoviet 
states  bordering  the  Black  Sea  region,  barring 
Belarus.
Another  danger  for  Polish  policy  lies  in  ill-fated 
triumphalism with  regard  to  Russia.  For  now the 
Russian  authorities  have  been  sent  a  powerful 
message to desist from trying to cause rifts within 
the EU, and to temper their economic and political 
activity in areas they view—rightly or wrongly—as 
lying  in  their  sphere  of  influence.  Moscow  is  to 
accept  that  its  erstwhile  satellites  and  countries 
once belonging to the former USSR are now fully 
fledged members of the European Union. If these 
facts impel the Russian authorities to mull over the 
matter—and flexibility in the face of resistance is a 
hallmark of its diplomacy—then the current cooling 
of  European-Russian  relations  may  prove  short-
lived,  and  will  certainly  not  amount  to  the  full 
adoption of the Polish or Baltic perspective in EU 
policy towards Russia. Especially since it remains, 
due  to  its  relative  stability  and  predictability,  a 
desirable  and  important  potential  partner  in 
grappling with more or less probable crises beyond 
the  EU eastern  frontier,  or  in  relations  with  Iran. 
Russia also retains its value as an important and, 
despite  recent  turmoil,  for  the  most  part  credible 
supplier  of  energy  resources  Europe  desperately 
needs. Irrespective of the Samara success, Poland 
is  in  no  position  to  change  this.  The  crisis  over 
Polish meat also illustrated the painful truth that the 
Kremlin  pays scant  heed to  Poland as such,  but 
that  it  cannot  ignore  Poland  qua  member  of  the 
European Union.
In the East...
There  is  a  further  aspect  proponents  of  a  fully 
autonomous, non-EU policy (not only towards the 
East)  ought  to  bear  in  mind.  A  Poland  with  a 
different  political  climate,  unperturbed  by  ruinous 
internal  strife,  could  become  a  leader  of  pro-
European transition to the East of its borders, and 
continue  the  policy  of  guiding  its  neighbours 
towards  a  free  market  economy  and  liberal 
democracy.  As  things  stand,  however,  the  actual 
clout of Polish foreign policy, towards the East and 
elsewhere, has dwindled. Poland’s internal politics 
has actually deprived the country of an important 
means  of  swaying  other  postsoviet  elites—its 
exemplary systemic convergence. Poland had until 
recently been hailed beyond our eastern borders as 
the  paragon  of  successful  transformation  from a 
totalitarian state to a free market  and democratic 
one.  What  postsoviet  economic-political,  military 
and spook elites found particularly attractive, to the 
dismay of many in Poland, was the fact that their 
 Polish counterparts seamlessly settled in the new 
state,  often  to  their  advantage.  This  was  one 
reason for president A. Kwaśniewski’s allure as a 
mediator  between  the  fractious  Ukrainian  elites 
during  the  so  called  orange  revolution.  Now, 
however, with the spectre of vindictive legislation, 
lustration,  decommunization,  demotion  and 
depriving  the  old  regime’s  officialdom  of  state 
pensions,  the  obvious  credibility  of  a  potential 
Polish  mediator  or  tutor  to  the  Belorussian  top 
brass has been undermined. Such “hardening” of 
Polish foreign policy has proceeded hand in hand 
with  a  whole  raft  of  personnel  changes  in  the 
country’s  diplomatic  corps—some  arise  from  the 
natural  political  calendar  (ambassadors),15 others 
from biological  processes  (members  of  post-PPR 
diplomatic  corps  reaching  retirement  age),  but 
many  were  linked  to  the  ruling  party’s  political 
doctrine (lustration, decommunization).16
Thus, Poland’s internal political and historical score 
settling—irrespective  of  particular  moral  appraisal 
thereof—deprive Poland of one of its most potent 
eastern  policy  tools.  Let  us  call  it  the  policy  of 
exemplary convergence in regard to postcommunist 
postsoviet apparatus. For it is hard to believe that 
success  there  is  attainable  by  turning  one’s 
attention  to  the  democratic  opposition,  which  for 
now lacks any real social backing.
15  Paweł Dobrowolski, the FO spokesman justified the 
minister’s decision in an official communiqué stating: “1. New 
authorities of the Republic of Poland are inspecting the 
state’s senior civil servants. With regard to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs this procedure pertains to senior posts in 
diplomatic missions. The process is of a long term character. 
2. New requirements of Polish foreign policy and the 
ministry’s streamlining of human resources management 
practices imply that persons returning to work in the Head 
Office shall be assigned new tasks. 3. At the same time, we 
consider it deeply unjust that the posts of ambassador of the 
Republic of Poland be held by persons with former links to 
the security services and PZPR apparatus. Republic of 
Poland authorities responsible for shaping the country’s 
foreign policy have lost confidence in such persons,” 
www.msz.gov.pl
16  Such motive was claimed by the media to lie behind 
recalling ambassadors in Berlin, Rome and Copenhagen, all 
of whom confessed to having cooperated with the PRP 
intelligence service.
This  problem is  especially  glaring  in  the  case  of 
Ukraine.  The  present  Polish  authorities’  ability  to 
influence  the  situation  there  is  visibly  less 
pronounced  than  under  their  predecessors,  both 
presidential  and  in  government.  President  L. 
Kaczyński’s  offer  to  mediate  during  the  conflict 
between  Ukraine’s  prime  minister  and  president 
was largely ignored. This attempt was not helped 
by prime minister Kaczyński publicly declaring his 
sympathies  with  the  “orange”  camp,  therefore 
effectively limiting Poland’s ability  to pressure the 
“blue”  camp  of  prime  minister  Yanukovych,  also 
after the seemingly imminent elections. Let us note 
that at the same time in Kiev, Poland’s ex-president 
A. Kwaśniewski organized talks, perhaps somewhat 
overoptimistically  portrayed  as  an  element  of 
mediation. Yet even he had nothing constructive to 
proffer to the Kiev authorities, since in contrast to 
2004 he lacked the backing of a strong Poland, not 
even to mention the European Union, and had to 
rely solely on his personal attributes, contacts and 
experience.  However, touting the attractiveness of 
Poland’s  Round  Table  compromise  to  the 
Ukrainians  at  a  time  when  it  is  being  officially 
questioned  and  reviled  in  Poland  itself,  as  is 
anyone  involved,  turned  out  to  be  too  parlous  a 
mission. A similar regularity will in all likelihood crop 
up  in  the  event  of  an  escalation  of  conflict  in 
Belarus, where the Poles side with a single faction 
of  the  country’s  fragmented  opposition,  leaving 
them with little sway over the incumbent president’s 
entourage.
It would, of course, be absurd to claim that Poland’s 
sole  means  of  impacting  on  eastern  elites  are 
“reformed”  former  apparatchiks,  of  whom  the 
country’s  administration  is  being  purged. 
Decommunization  of  state  structures,  somewhat 
belated  and  hardly  enticing  to  neighbours,  would 
not constitute such propaganda baggage in eastern 
policy were Poland able to occupy the centre, and 
 not the fringes, or even the rearguard, (“naysayers”) 
of  EU  policy.  For  we  must  preferably  present 
ourselves  to  our  eastern  neighbours  both  as  an 
alluring example of  democratic  and pro-European 
transition for their societies, and as a specimen of 
successful,  relatively  painless  systemic 
transformation which for their former elites does not 
end in prison or on a paltry pension. However, if on 
the  one  hand  the  present  authorities  dissociate 
themselves  from the  success  of  Polish  transition 
and paint almost as gloomy a picture of European 
integration as Lukashenko’s propaganda, and the 
fate  of  their  Polish  comrades  impels  other 
postsoviet  elites  to  demand whether  it  is  in  their 
best interest to follow this path, then instruments of 
influence are significantly weakened.
CONCLUSIONS:
Polish  foreign  policy  has  become  one  of 
many battlefields of internal political strife, a 
battlefield  that  is  witnessing  some  of  the 
most  demagogic,  populist  and aggressive 
skirmishes. As a result, the prospects for a 
bipartisan  consensus,  similar  to  that 
present throughout the 1990s, are nonexis-
tent,  especially  given  no  common  objec-
tives or preferred means of attaining them. 
This is already evident at the stage where 
particular parties articulate their priorities. 
Escalation of political turmoil as parliamen-
tary and presidential terms draw to a close 
shall  have  deleterious  consequences  for 
Poland’s ability to shape and implement its 
foreign policy,  significantly  diminishing the 
present government’s proclivity to compro-
mise both in its relations with the EU, and 
Germany in particular, and those with Rus-
sia.
Radical  political  projects,  such as decom-
munization,  deubekization  (from  UB, 
acronym  for  communist  Poland’s  internal 
intelligence  service)  and  universal  lustra-
tion, which challenge the very foundations 
of  Poland’s transition and detract  from its 
success, greatly reduce the attractiveness 
of  Poland  as  leader  and  instigator  of 
prodemocracy  and  pro-market  reforms  in 
the East.
Precarious political situation in Poland, and 
particularly  the  permanent  pre-election 
campaign,  negatively  affect  both  substan-
tive  shape  and  presentation  of  Poland’s 
strategic and tactical  foreign policy objec-
tives,  sometimes  making  it  indiscernible, 
especially to foreign partners.
The  assertion  that  particular  EU  member 
states  possess  their  own  interests  ought 
not  to  lead  one  to  repudiate  the point  of 
deeper European integration.  Besides ex-
ceptional circumstances, criticized not just 
by Poland,  member  states’ national  inter-
ests  are  in  fact  secured  through  the  EU, 
and not against it. Whence the conclusion 
that Poland could follow suit if it achieved a 
level  of  efficacy  in  this  domain,  as  mea-
sured by capability to cooperate and forge 
substantive and rational alliances, and not 
ideological  or  wishful  ones.  However,  a 
Poland that is conceived as anti-European, 
uncooperative and culturally alien (in its for-
bearance  towards  xenophobia  or  anti-
Semitism) lacks coalition building capacity 
on the European arena.
Perceiving  Poland’s  weakness,  eastern 
political elites turn away from Warsaw and 
towards  Brussels  or  other  major  capitals, 
and especially Berlin and Paris, for advice 
and protection. Within the European Union 
 this undermines our standing as a source 
of analyses and realistic political proposals 
which would inform the EU’s common east-
ern policy.
Poland’s diminished clout in the European 
Union,  amounting  to  the  present  govern-
ment’s  isolation,  also  reduces  our  attrac-
tiveness as an ally of the United States. Ac-
cepting  elements  of  the  Missile  Defence 
System on Polish soil does, of course, bind 
Poland’s  security  to  America’s  ever  more 
tightly,  but  does  not  extend  its  ability  to 
nudge EU partners in the pro-Atlantic direc-
tion.  And this is something Washington is 
especially keen on.
Postscript (August 23rd 2007)
The  above  analysis  was  written  just  before  the 
latest  crisis,  with  the  definitive  breakup  of  the 
coalition  and  announcement  of  an  early  general 
election.
The  prospect  of  a  brisk  formation  of  a  new 
government creates new possibilities also in foreign 
policy. On the condition that negative experiences 
of the current approach to formulating foreign policy 
objectives  and  selecting  means  of  implementing 
them are analyzed.
Both president Lech Kaczyński and prime minister 
Jarosław  Kaczyński  jointly  underscore  that  their 
“assertive”  policy  has  meant  that  the  EU can  no 
longer  ignore  Polish  interests.  The  best  way  to 
ensure  that  any  essential,  truly  strategic  Polish 
interests  are  secured  is  active  and  positive 
participation in a common European Union policy.
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